

Plato's Psychology and the Theory of Forms in the *Republic*

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The definition of justice in Book IV, 'becoming oneself one's own friend' (443d5), is presented as an answer to the Glaucon's challenge or the Thrasymachean argument. This answer is called as 'a mere sketch (ὑπογραφήν)' (504d6), i.e. the tripartite theory of the soul. In what sense is it 'a mere sketch'? As a first step, it can be understood as used in accordance with the difference in preciseness of argumentation between the discussion until Book IV, which is based on the correspondence with the city, and that of the so-called central Books, from Book V to Book VII, which expounds the theory of Forms. In fact, the discussion on the correspondence with the city is pointed out as 'fell short of exactness' (504b5-6). However, what does the difference in preciseness mean? For instance, is the above-mentioned definition of justice, 'becoming oneself one's own friend', understood better through the theory of Forms? Or, does the theory of Forms overwrite the discussion until Book IV and make it useless? Rethinking a link between the account of the soul in Book IV and that in the central Books, I answer these questions in the way that both of them are necessary in establishing a constitution (*politeia*) in human being and a city, while they should be contrasted as a sketch and a finished work.