Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966-1969 : An Overview

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—An Overview—

Andrew G. Walder

The broad outline of events during the tumultuous early phase of the Cultural Revolution has long been familiar. A student "Red Guard" movement originated in August 1966, and wrought havoc in schools and nearby neighborhoods. The Red Guards split into factions, one of which styled themselves as "rebels" (*zaofan pai*) and targeted local government officials, and after receiving Mao's open support in October, gained strength. In late November industrial workers joined in the fray with a rebel movement of their own, and they too broke into factions. Street protests by rebel insurgents and clashes between different factions threatened public order and economic stability in several large cities, spurring a pivotal power seizure by rebels in the city of Shanghai in January 1967.

The Shanghai action received the enthusiastic approval of Mao and his followers in Beijing, touching off a wave of similar actions in other provinces and large cities. The power seizures in most provinces failed to restore order and ushered in an unstable period of factional conflict that raged out of control until the armed forces were called upon to establish order in the form of new "Revolutionary Committees." The insurgencies subsided gradually across China as order was eventually imposed, in most regions under martial law, late in 1968. The earliest accounts — initially pieced together from cryptic reports gleaned from the official newspapers and transcripts of local radio broadcasts — laid down a basic chronology that has not been fundamentally altered by subsequent research.

Understanding of these events was enriched and deepened by later scholarship that drew on intensive interviewing of emigrés in Hong Kong, Red Guard newspapers, oral histories and fieldwork conducted in China, and a large wave of previously unavailable documentary sources and archival research. The much richer body of materials available in the post-Mao era has supported new research on a variety of subjects: narrative accounts of the period and of Mao's role (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006), of conflict in individual provinces and cities (Bu Weihua 2008; Dong and Walder 2010, 2011, 2012; Forster 1990; Wang 1995), and of the politics of key insurgent groups (Perry and Li 1997; Walder 2009).

These studies focus on large cities and institutions that were at the epicenter of national politics, and on the students and workers who participated actively in the urban insurgencies. Yet true scope of the upheaval at the national level remains obscure. Early publications concluded that the Cultural Revolution was primarily an urban phenomenon (Baum 1971). Work based on post-Mao sources indicated an extensive impact in the rural hinterland, though delayed (Walder and Su 2003). Publications based on Mao-era sources described insurgencies with scant reference to deadly violence, while post-Mao accounts emphasized violent persecutions that included beatings, torture, and even mass killings (Su 2006, 2011; Walder 2009; Walder and Su 2003). Early studies considered the Cultural Revolution to have ended in 1968, with the imposition of martial law and formation of Revolutionary Committees, and ended their accounts then (Lee 1978; Rosen 1982; Walder 1978). But post-Mao sources made clear that a wave of state-directed terror began with the imposition of martial law (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006; Walder and Su 2003).

These contributions have only deepened questions about the temporal and geographic scope of these political activities, the severity of the repression that followed, and ultimately about the impact of these events of this period on the people who lived through them. In this research I draw in part on an underexploited source of information to address these questions. Local annals (*difang zhi*), published nationwide beginning in the late 1980s, revive a historical tradition from China's imperial past. The imperial versions were chronicles of local history, surveys of the local economy and society, biographies of imperial degree holders, prominent families, and other local notables. Surviving annals from the last two dynasties, the Ming and Qing, have served as sources of evidence about patterns of popular protest and collective violence (Rowe 2007; Tong 1991). The publication of a new wave of local annals was mandated in the mid-1980s, and by the first decade of this century virtually all localities had published one.

A long effort to collect relevant accounts from these publications yielded a near-complete collection of local accounts for 2,243 local jurisdictions: 174 cities and 2,069 counties. These accounts were coded and assembled into a database that records all of the events chronicled in the published narratives, supplemented in some cases by other published sources and unpublished documentary materials. The resulting database records the month that an event occurred (and specific day, if provided), the type of action that it represented, and any associated information about its impact (deaths,

injuries, victims). Although the quality of local accounts and their level of detail vary considerably, in the aggregate the annals yield an extraordinary amount of information. The database contains information about 33,400 events at the city or county level from June 1966 to December 1971 according to the month they occurred, and a subset of 17,829 of them by a specific date. It also contains data for 24 variables that describe the demographic or political characteristics of the locality, or the features of the account from which the event data were coded.

The database includes only a small fraction of the total number of political events that occurred nationwide during this period. Excluded almost by definition are the hundreds of thousands of small-scale events — surely even millions — that occurred within individual schools, factories, and villages. Only the largest and most consequential of these are ever mentioned in histories compiled at the county or city level. This is not a serious drawback for this project, which is about insurgent activities that targeted city or county governments and their leaders, or actions by the forces of order to suppress them. Activities that do not have an impact beyond the boundaries of schools or workplaces do not bear directly on the questions of interest in this book. In other words, the sources are biased toward reporting events that are of greatest relevance.

However, the database also contains only a fraction of the larger and more consequential events that *are* relevant to this inquiry—for example, invasions of government offices, clashes between rebel groups and the armed forces, armed battles between insurgent factions, seizures of party officials, military suppression of armed insurgents, and so forth. Even for the events that are recorded in these annals, information about their impact in terms of the number of people involved, or the number of deaths, injuries, or other consequences of the action is also incomplete. Due to limitations of information available to those who compile accounts, the level of effort and resources put into the compilation, and the inherent biases reflected in what is considered appropriate or important enough to report, all data of this sort are filtered. Essentially, a dataset of this kind is a sample from an underlying population of events, and any attempt to use such data for purposes of statistical inference must deal carefully with the potential biases of the sample (Walder 2014).

As it turns out, certain major political events that represented important turning points appear to have been reported with great accuracy and completeness — in particular, the date of a power seizure that marked the collapse of local party-state organs, or the establishment of a local Revolutionary Committee that marked the foundation

of a new political order. Events that occurred repeatedly and much more commonly—for example, clashes between armed rebel factions—are undoubtedly reported with much less completeness. But we can assume that they are reported more frequently during periods when they were in fact most common.

As we shall see, the pattern of events reflected in the dataset conforms broadly to the familiar chronology of the period. But we also learn a great deal about matters that have long been obscure: about the timing of events across *all* of China, urban as well as rural; the extent and speed with which the insurgency spread in both city and countryside; the extent to which and speed with which local governments were overthrown; the timing and impact of intervention by local armed forces; and the scale and impact of repression applied to popular insurgencies in the effort to re-establish local government. Moreover, by clarifying and sharpening our understanding of these broad patterns, new puzzles become apparent, and they require further investigation.

Local Settings: Urban versus Rural

As we trace indicators of conflict across time and space, we will draw on data about 2,243 cities and counties. It will become evident that similar kinds of events occurred very widely in a remarkably coordinated fashion across the vast majority of jurisdictions. I will trace the spread of political events separately across cities and counties. The cities had much larger and more concentrated populations than the counties, and these populations contained much larger numbers of students and workers, the populations from which the early rebel insurgencies against city and county governments were primarily drawn. Only a small number of the jurisdictions were cities (174). The rest were counties (2,069) whose populations were overwhelmingly rural and in many cases geographically remote.

It is natural to expect that the insurgencies in cities were larger and that they developed more rapidly than in counties. Each political jurisdiction had only one government to which rebel insurgents would be drawn, but the governments of cities faced vastly larger populations of students and workers than their counterparts in the counties—and the insurgencies that they faced were potentially much larger and more threatening. The cities contained an average of 559,250 people—20 of them had populations in excess of 1 million. The urban residents of cities were concentrated in a single core that comprised 66 percent of the total population (the rest were in suburban collective farms). The cities contained an average of 141,202 salaried workers:

10 of them contained more than 500 thousand, 3 of them more than 1 million. Shanghai, the largest by far, contained 2.7 million.

The counties, which comprised more than 90 percent of all jurisdictions, are a striking contrast. An average of only 8.6 percent of county populations lived in urban settlements, the rest were scattered across rural collective farms, most of which were a considerable distance from county seats on poor road networks. The county seats, where party and government headquarters were located, were typically the largest of the small towns in the county, the rest of which served as the headquarters of people's communes. The average county had a total population of 311,123, 22,767 urban residents and 6,488 salaried workers. One quarter of the counties had fewer than 2,550 salaried workers; half had fewer than 4,880. The populations capable of supporting significant rebel insurgencies in most county seats were very small—in many cases smaller than the workforce of state enterprises in the cities. The insurgencies that nonetheless managed to take root in county seats drew on much smaller populations, which would lead us to expect that their potential impact was also smaller.

The Initial Mobilizations

Insurgencies by students and workers developed very rapidly in the last half of 1966, and they spread widely and almost as rapidly in counties as in cities. Figure 1 displays the spread of the initial surge of student political activism. For each jurisdiction, we recorded the date for the first mention of local student "Red Guard" activity. The figure provides the cumulative percentage, by month, of the jurisdictions that reported activities by local Red Guards. There is a huge jump in August 1966, reaching 90 percent of cities and close to 95 percent by September. The student movement in counties also grew rapidly, but somewhat delayed. It would take until November for the percentage to reach its maximum penetration of 90 percent. The student movement in the larger cities always involved students from local universities as well as secondary schools; post-secondary students were almost completely absent from county seats.

These numbers only tell us whether local students engaged in Red Guard activities— writing critical wall posters against teachers or principals, vandalizing temples or churches, or the seizure of teachers, school administrators or government officials for denunciation meetings known as "struggle sessions." They do not convey the relative size of student mobilizations, although we can assume, given the large differences in student populations, that Red Guards were a larger and more politically disruptive

force in cities than in the county seats.

Red Guards initially focused entirely on their own schools and nearby neighborhoods, but by early fall some of them began to launch attacks on local political authorities, especially after the pivotal October Party conference in Beijing that encouraged attacks on local officials for trying to contain the student rebellion. Those who turned their rebellion against local authorities adopted a new identity as a "rebel faction" (*zaofan pai*). By November workers also began to organize their own rebel groups, often joining forces with student rebels. These rebel insurgencies are conventionally understood to be the forces that destabilized and eventually overthrew local governments, most famously in Shanghai, beginning in January 1967.

Figure 2 traces the steady spread of rebel challenges to local party and government officials. It displays the cumulative percentage of cities and counties that reported local activity by "rebel" organizations. Rebel movements spread much more slowly than the initial Red Guard mobilizations and also, it appears, less extensively. By the end of 1966, only some 77 percent of cities reported any rebel activity, and only 59 percent of counties. It would take until February 1967, more than a month after the famous Shanghai power seizure, for 90 percent of cities to report any rebel activity at all, by which point barely 80 percent of counties had done so.

These figures, like those reported in Figure 1, only trace the number of jurisdictions that report any rebel activity. They do not indicate the extent to which local rebel movements had grown to the point that they had a significant political impact. Figure 3 sheds some light on this issue. It traces the cumulative percentage of cities and counties that report the seizure of a leading official in the city or county for a "struggle session". In such a struggle session — a standardized repertoire of protest during the Cultural Revolution — an individual was forcibly placed on a stage and subjected to shouted accusations and ritual humiliation of varying degrees of brutality. Faculty and administrators of schools were widely subjected to such treatment from the outset of the Red Guard movement, and rebel workers also routinely subjected officials in their factories to such treatment. Figure 3 is based on reports that at least one ranking official in the local party and government headquarters was subjected to treatment of this sort. This can be understood as a measure of the magnitude and impact of local rebel insurgencies, because such an action represents a loss of control by local government officials of a kind that might indicate their vulnerability to a rebel power seizure.

By this measure the political impact of rebel insurgencies was more modest than the trend traced in Figure 2, even if we assume that local annals underreported the

initial seizures of local government officials. By the end of 1966 only 40 percent of cities, and only 27 percent of counties, reported the seizure of local officials, barely half of the localities that reported the existence of a local rebel movement. Not until February 1967, well into the period during which power seizures took place, did the percentage of cities reporting the capture of officials for struggle sessions approach 70 percent, and in counties close to 50 percent. By this point the seizure of officials would partially indicate the fact that a power seizure had already occurred.

By any reasonable comparative standard these figures reflect an extraordinary level of political mobilization. Almost all cities and counties had active Red Guards by October 1966, and more than 90 percent of cities and counties harbored active rebel groups by early 1967. Insurgent activities developed somewhat more slowly in counties than in cities, but after a delay of a few months the figures for counties approached that of cities. This level of insurgent mobilization is all the more remarkable given the small urban populations of county seats and the remote geographic location of large numbers of the more than two thousand counties. This high level of mobilization presents a puzzle that can only partly be explained by the resources made available to insurgents by their elite sponsors, and by rapid changes in the political opportunity structure, especially the selective suspension of the state's considerable forces of repression. It makes even more pressing the question of what motivated such widespread insurgencies, and indeed what was the nature of the rebel movement that developed so widely and rapidly in the last half of 1966.

The Overthrow of Local Governments

The next phase of China's political upheaval began in 1967, and was ushered in by the celebrated power seizure in the city of Shanghai on January 6, 1967. The action was carried out with the deep involvement of Maoist officials in the capital. Over the next 5 days, the authorities of 6 counties scattered across other provinces were overthrown; Shanghai's impact was not truly felt until its power seizure received the enthusiastic praise of Beijing's Maoist authorities in the national media on January 12. Over the next 10 days no fewer than 75 more cities and counties experienced power seizures by rebel forces, and many local annals named the Shanghai precedent as their inspiration.

The wave of power seizures accelerated on January 22, 1967: on that day the national media urged rebel forces nationwide to seize power over their own localities

and bring the rebel insurgency to a victorious conclusion. The editorial's impact can be likened to a tidal wave, or perhaps an explosion. Over the next 9 *days* another 1,023 cities and counties experienced power seizures, bringing the total to 1,086—just under half of all political jurisdictions in the country. By the end of February, the number reached 1,557, and by the end of March, 1,727—78 percent of all cities and counties in China.

The remarkably rapid spread of power seizures across China, reaching deeply even into rural counties, is portrayed in Figure 4. There are two puzzling aspects to the numbers portrayed in this figure. The first is their relationship with the cumulative percentages in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 indicates reports of *any* rebel activity, without reference to the size and magnitude of the local rebel insurgency. The percentage of cities and counties with *any* rebel activity in December 1966 (Figure 2) is not much higher than the percentage of cities and counties that experienced power seizures in January 1967 (Figure 4). More importantly, only 40 percent of cities reported rebel insurgencies that had seized officials by December 1966, and fewer than 28 percent of counties (Figure 3). Yet the next month 70 percent of cities and more close to 50 percent of counties had experienced power seizures (Figure 4). There is also a close correspondence between the numbers for seizures of officials in January and February 1967 portrayed in Figure 3 and the figures for power seizures portrayed in Figure 4 for the same months. The seizure of officials accelerates rapidly from the prior month, quickly converging with the numbers for power seizures. This suggests that the spread of power seizures was far more rapid and extensive than the scale of prior rebel insurgencies would have predicted—it is not plausible to assume that all local rebel insurgencies across China were equally strong. Either rebel insurgencies experienced suddenly explosive growth almost everywhere in the first weeks of 1967, or there were many power seizures that occurred in the absence of strong student and worker movements.

The second puzzling aspect of Figure 4 further indicates that power seizures occurred far out of proportion to the scale of local student and worker insurgencies. The percentage of counties that experienced power seizures lagged only slightly behind that of cities. By February 1967 the numbers had converged to the point that the gap was only 10 percent. Despite the vastly larger populations of students and workers in cities and their greater concentration in a single urban core, counties experienced rebel power seizures at almost as high a rate as the cities. It turns out that a previously neglected group participated actively in rebel challenges to local party-state leaders—the

cadres who staffed the local political bureaucracy. These cadres, it turns out, were active participants in power seizures from within the government hierarchy itself, and they were the dominant force in the county seats (Walder 2016).

Intervention by the Armed Forces

The next phase in these conflicts began at the very end of January. If rebel power seizures were to bring popular insurgencies to a victorious conclusion, they needed the ability to enforce their authority. Mao ordered military support for rebels who had begun to seize power across the country, and on January 28, 1967, the Military Affairs Commission issued an order for troops nationwide to support rebels who had seized power from local governments (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 175-177). From this point forward local political conflicts pivoted away from attacks on local party-state authorities to a new issue: the defense of power seizures by new claimants to local political power.

It has long been clear that this early attempt to provide military support to rebels failed to stabilize new structures of power in most regions of China. This raises questions about the timing and extent of military intervention. Was intervention by the armed forces too late to stabilize the new order? Or was intervention too limited in geographic scope, leaving rebels in large regions of China without the military support that they had been promised?

Figure 5 traces the spread of military intervention. It displays the cumulative percentage of local jurisdictions where military units are first mentioned as taking any kind of action to "support the left." This could simply be a declaration of support for the new power holders, but it often involved the sending of soldiers to protect government headquarters or to secure radio stations, post offices, banks, train stations, or other locations crucial to the maintenance of public order. It is clear from Figure 5 that military intervention was extensive, and that it reached high levels of coverage very early in 1967. The military intervened at the county level almost as extensively as it did in the cities, and the levels of military intervention match almost exactly the extent of the power seizures. It is clear, therefore, that the reason why military intervention failed to curtail local conflicts at this early date was not because the armed forces failed to intervene in large regions of China. The coverage of "military support" was remarkably complete.

This raises the question of timing. How long did it take for military units to act in

support of power seizures? For the 471 jurisdictions for which we know the exact date of both the power seizure and the first military intervention, the median number of days that the military intervened after a power seizure in cities was 25 days, and in counties 32 days. For the 1,588 jurisdictions for which we know only the month of both events, the military intervened an average of 1.2 calendar months after the power seizure in cities, and 1.9 months in counties. In light of the high levels of popular mobilization that is already evident in our data, and the remarkably rapid development of rebel insurgencies and power seizures across China, a period of one month or more would seem ample time for new local conflicts to develop between claimants to political power and their opponents. In such a situation, the armed forces would not simply be acting to "support the left", but would be intervening in the midst of entrenched conflicts between rival groups who already were contesting over local power. This indicates that an understanding of developments during the period between the seizure of power and the intervention of the military is crucial for explaining the deeply rooted conflicts that would continue throughout 1967.

The next phase of military intervention was the establishment of a "Military Control Committee" — essentially a form of martial law. Figure 6 traces the formal establishment of such Committees across China. They assumed many of the functions of government. When a locality was placed under military control, it marked a more assertive stance on the part of the military authorities, and generally a more aggressive response to those who continued to challenge the new organs of power. Two notable things are evident in the Figure. First, it takes almost to the end of 1967 for Military Control Committees in cities to be established at levels that match the extent of power seizures. Second, these Committees were established in counties far less extensively during 1967 than in cities, despite the fact that the initial military intervention in counties was almost as rapid and almost as extensive as in cities. By the end of 1967 only 58 percent of counties had been placed under military control, far less than the 81 percent of cities. In counties where military control *was* established, it took almost twice as long to do so. In cities where a Military Control Committee was established, it took place on average 1.8 calendar months after the first military intervention; in counties it took 2.9 months. This indicates that there were differences in the nature of military intervention — and perhaps also in the nature of local conflicts, that made counties more difficult to stabilize.

The national patterns suggest that it is important to understand the evolution of political conflicts in the period immediately after a local power seizure, before the

intervention of the armed forces, and the impact of military intervention on these conflicts. They also suggest that there may be something different about the nature of military control in counties, and perhaps also about the nature of local conflicts, that are different from cities, making them more difficult to stabilize.

The Escalation of Collective Violence

The initial intervention of the armed forces did little to quell insurgent activity. Figure 7 traces the number of reported armed conflicts between insurgent factions, attacks by insurgents on military or civilian authorities, and any other event reportedly initiated by insurgents. The figure displays monthly counts of such events relative to the month of a local power seizure. Negative numbers to the left of the "0" point are months prior to a local power seizure; positive numbers to the right are months afterwards. The trend line does not cast doubt on the longstanding observation that military intervention failed to quell local conflicts. But it does show something more interesting: popular insurgencies actually expanded several-fold *after* the intervention of the armed forces.

Figure 7 shows a peak in insurgent activity some 6 months before a local power seizure, and an even larger peak that coincided with the power seizures. Both of these peaks, however, are dwarfed by the escalation in insurgent activity that began 3 months after a local power seizure and that reached a peak roughly 7 months afterwards. At this point the monthly number of reported insurgent events was roughly 4 times the figure for the month of the power seizure itself. For well over one year afterwards, the number of insurgent events far exceeded the level observed during power seizures. This tends to confirm our earlier observation that the spread of power seizures did not appear to be closely related to the scale of local rebel insurgencies. Relative to what came later, the level of popular mobilization associated with power seizures was modest. It also suggests that by far the largest conflicts during this period were not over efforts to overthrow local party-state officials. Instead, they were motivated by conflicts over the power seizures themselves, by the initial actions of the armed forces, or both. Military intervention may actually have had the adverse impact of *escalating* local conflicts — note that insurgent activity initially declined immediately after a power seizure, but rebounded rapidly at the point in time that military intervention first occurred — an average of 1.8 months after the power seizure.

Levels of violence also increased markedly along with the scale of insurgencies.

Figure 8 records the number of deaths attributed to the insurgent activities displayed in Figure 7. It is striking that the period leading up to power seizures generated the least number of reported deaths for the entire period, and the month that coincided with power seizures was the smallest of the 8 monthly peaks evident in the graph. The large spike in reported deaths in month 7 coincides with the even larger spike in number of insurgent events for that month reported in Figure 7, which in most regions would have been in the summer of 1967. However, violence appears to have escalated further in 1968. Despite the much smaller number of insurgent events reported after month 11 in Figure 7, the number of reported deaths is much higher. Figure 7 indicates that there were more than twice as many insurgent events in month 7 than in month 17, but far fewer deaths. The average number of reported deaths per event was almost four times higher at the peak in 1968 than the peak in 1967.

The massive escalation of insurgent activity and related violence *after* military intervention reinforces our interest in understanding the consequences of the events that followed in the month or so after a power seizure — clearly a period that generated much larger and longer-lasting conflicts, and perhaps based on different motivations than the ones that led to power seizures. Levels of popular mobilization and collective violence were relatively modest in the period leading up to and during the seizure of power from local party-state officials. Popular insurgencies grew rapidly roughly one month after power seizures, at about the time that military forces first intervened locally. The violence continued to escalate well into 1968, and reached a peak shortly before insurgent activity finally subsided.

Rebuilding Political Order

Mass insurgencies gradually subsided during 1968, a development that coincided with the formal establishment of a Revolutionary Committee that marked the formation of a new organ of power. After the approval of a Revolutionary Committee by new provincial authorities (which in turn had the prior approval of Beijing), the armed forces took a more aggressive stance toward rebels who refused to disband their organizations and cease their activities. Accounts of this period have long recognized that the formation of Revolutionary Committees marked the end of more than two years of popular mobilization.

Figure 9 traces the establishment of Revolutionary Committees over more than two years. The effort early in 1967 to formalize power seizures by quickly approving

newly formed Revolutionary Committees quickly stalled. By mid-1967 only 10 percent of jurisdictions had formed Revolutionary Committees — something made impossible by the upsurge of local insurgent conflicts in the spring of that year. Not until the end of 1967 did the formation of Revolutionary Committees resume. The process accelerated in the first half of 1968. By November of that year more than 95 percent of jurisdictions had one, by which point further insurgent activity was rare.

Figure 10 traces insurgent activity alongside actions by authorities designed to suppress it — military actions against rebels or suppression campaigns designed to undermine opposition to local authorities. Insurgent activity reached a peak roughly 6 months prior to the formation of a Revolutionary Committee and declined steadily in the months leading up to its establishment. Suppression activities by military or civilian authorities grew rapidly in the two months prior, and shortly before the formation of Revolutionary Committees the reported actions of authorities outnumbered those of insurgents. Suppression activities continued at high levels during the first 4 months after the formation of the Revolutionary Committee and declined slowly thereafter, lowering residual levels of insurgent activity, which was almost entirely eliminated after one year. The trend lines in Figure 10 are what one would expect if authorities were gradually consolidating their control over unruly mobilized groups.

Figure 11, however, suggests something very different. It traces the number of reported deaths associated with the actions displayed in Figure 10, and shows that repression by authorities generated casualties that far outweighed by several orders of magnitude the numbers generated by the insurgency it was ostensibly meant to suppress. The number of deaths due to insurgent activities reached a peak four months before the formation of a Revolutionary Committee and dropped steadily thereafter. Casualties due to the actions of authorities matched the earlier peak level of the insurgency two months prior to the formation of the Revolutionary Committee and remained high until that date, which would suggest the application of force deemed necessary to permit the Committee's formation. Surprisingly, however, the number of deaths generated by the authorities continued to rise to levels that far exceeded anything observed since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Four months into Revolutionary Committees' reign the number of deaths still exceeded the previous monthly peak due to the insurgency by more than 5-fold, and levels remained extremely high until gradually subsiding after 8 months. The level of violent repression far exceeded anything that could reasonably be interpreted as necessary to demobilize an insurgency, and it continued to escalate long after insurgent activity was effectively brought under control.

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Figure 1. The Spread of Student Red Guard Activity, Late 1966



Figure 2. The Spread of Rebel Insurgencies, Late 1966-Early 1967



Figure 3. Seizures of Government Officials, Late 1966-Early 1967



Figure 4. Rebel Power Seizures over Local Governments, Early 1967



Figure 5. The Spread of Military Intervention, 1967



Figure 6. The Creation of Military Control Committees, 1967-1968



Figure 7. Insurgent Conflicts, Relative to Local Power Seizures



Figure 8. Deaths due to Insurgent Conflicts, Relative to Local Power Seizures



Figure 9. Establishment of Local Revolutionary Committees



Figure 10. Insurgent Activity Relative to Repression by Authorities



Figure 11. Deaths due to Insurgent Actions versus the Actions of Authorities